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Abstract
Gonzalez and Paqueo examine  the effects of budget  reducing the volatility  of social sector expenditures.  The
stabilization  funds-often called rainy-day funds-on the  authors  also find that states that have stringent deposit
volatility of social  spending and, for contrast, on  and withdrawal rules have  higher  rainy-day fund
nonsocial sector spending. They  analyze the rainy-day  balances, and thus are more effective  in reducing the
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I.  INTRODUCTION
Reflecting  increasing  concern  about  economic  insecurity  and  its  social  welfare
consequences,  an analysis of Latin American  countries  reveals the need for better social
risk management  systems  to  deal  with economic  shocks  and  uncertainty  (De  Ferranti,
Perry, et al., 2000).  Such a system involves a combination of policy instruments  ranging
from market insurance and  self-insurance  to social protection.  One of these instruments
highlighted  in the  above-mentioned  study  is the budget  stabilization  fund,  often  called
"rainy-day  fund." 'Noting that many  countries  suffer from  pro-cyclical  social spending,
they  argued  for  governments  to save  in good  times  to finance  social  spending  in bad
times.  To quote:
"The poor  do not, for example, frequently pull their  children out of school during bad
times-although they do when the recession is severe. But the fact that some educational
and health outcomes are hurt during  especially bad times may be as much the result of
the government's inability to maintain the quality of  social  services as the household's
decision to invest less during crises...  Governments should save in good times to finance
social spending in bad times... " (De Ferranti, Perry, et al., 2002, pp. 9-10)
During the last two decades,  virtually all of the U.S. states have adopted rainy-day
funds, that allow them to smooth public spending over time by saving during booms and
using the balances to cover revenue shortfalls during recessions.  Prior to  1981,  few states
had such funds (Gold (1981), and Knight and Levinson (1999a)).  By 1984,  18  states had
enacted rainy day funds, and by 1994, 45 states had them (Knight and Levinson (1999a)).
In 2000,  almost all of the U.S.  states have  adopted budget stabilization  funds,  and  their
balances averaged $158 per capita, or 3.22 percent of total state expenditures.
This  paper  examines  the  effect  of rainy-day  funds  on  the  volatility  of social
spending  and,  for  contrast,  on  non-social  sector  expenditures.  Further,  it  analyzes
empirically  the determinants  of the  size of the  rainy funds.  The  characteristics  of state
rainy-day  funds  differ  across  states,  in  particular  in  terms  of the  stringency  of their
3deposit and withdrawal rules as well as the fund's size. This paper examines those afore-
mentioned rules and other factors  in determining the size of the rainy-day funds. Analysis
of  the  U.S.  experience  could  reveal  useful  lessons  for  Latin  American  and  other
developing countries.
II.  LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature  on "rainy-day  funds"  is  summarized  in table  1. Navin and Navin
(1994) examine the state budget stabilization funds of Indiana,  Iowa, Missouri,  Michigan,
Minnesota,  Ohio  and  Wisconsin.  In  particular,  they  examined  the  movement  of fund
balances  over time  (1983-1991)  to  see how the  fund balances move in relation to some
indicators of fiscal health. The authors find that the use of these funds varies significantly
among states as does the level of funding and therefore the ability of these tools to serve
as effective instruments of counter-cyclical  state fiscal policy.
Sobel and Holcombe  (1996)  examined  the degree to which rainy-day  funds eased
the  fiscal  stress  experienced  by  states  during  the  1990-1991  recession.  The  authors
constructed a measure  of state fiscal stress  as the amount  of discretionary  tax increases
plus the amount by which expenditure growth fell below average. Then,  they constructed
an  empirical  model  to  see whether  the presence  of an explicit  rainy-day  fund  had  an
effect on the degree of fiscal stress experience by a state.  Sobel and Holcombe found that
rainy-day  funds  were  effective  in  reducing  fiscal  stress  if  they  had  mandatory
requirements  for making  deposits.  Also,  they  show  that  for  a  given  amount of fiscal
stress,  states  that  have  rainy-day  funds  are  more  likely to  cope with  that  fiscal  stress
through spending reductions than through increases in taxes.
Levinson (1998)  shows  that stringent balanced budget  requirements  enforced  in
some  U.S.  states have  exacerbated  business  cycles in those  states.  He also  shows  that
states  with  rainy-day  funds  have  smoother  business  cycle  fluctuations.  Knight  and
Levinson (1999a) examined the effect of rainy-day funds on state savings behavior. They
found that states with rainy-day  funds have higher total balances than states without such
funds  and also  have higher  balances  after adoption than  before  adoption.  Furthermore,
4rainy-day  fund  deposits  increase  total balances  dollar-for-dollar.  In  sum,  according  to
these  authors rainy-day  funds  appear to belong  to the  growing  set of fiscal  institutions
with real  fiscal and  economic  consequences.  Wagner  (1999)  shows that the increase  in
state budget stabilization  funds is attributed to the 1980-1982 recession.
In  a  descriptive  analysis  of commodity-based  stabilization  and  savings  funds
currently  in place  in  Norway,  Chile,  Alaska,  Venezuela,  Kuwait,  and  Oman,  Fasano
(2000) finds that the outcome of their experience has so far been mixed, with differences
among  countries  reflecting  differences  in  objectives,  institutional  arrangements,
adherence  to  operational  rules,  and  the  soundness  of  the  overall  fiscal  policy.
Nevertheless,  he  observed  that  in most  cases  the  stabilization  funds  he reviewed  have
contributed to the enhancement  of the effectiveness of fiscal policy by making the budget
expenditure less driven by revenue availability.
With  respect  to  the  determinants  of adoption  of rainy-day  funds,  Wagner  and
Sobel  (2001)  shows  that  states  with  tax  and  expenditure  limit  laws  in  place  were
significantly  more  likely  to  establish  these  funds.  They  were  significantly  less  likely,
however,  to  adopt  funds with stringent deposit  and withdrawal  rules. This  suggests that
some states adopted budget stabilization funds to circumvent existing  fiscal constraints.
Finally,  in the  most recent  study of the  issue, Gonzalez  (2002)  has  found these
rainy-day  funds  to  be ineffective,  consistent  with  the  findings  of Sobel  and  Holcombe
(1996) and Wagner and Sobel (2001). Noting that most of the states are not well prepared
for the most recent recession,  he finds that only 4 out of 50 states have enough rainy-day
funds  to ease  a recession  similar to that of the early  1990s.  In this regard,  he points out
that the reason why some states don't have enough savings is because they have reached
their cap on the fund size.
The above review of the literature  reveals that current analyses have not examined
the impact of stabilization  funds on social  expenditures.  They have been limited mainly
5to  the  analysis  of their effectiveness  in smoothing  total  spending  and  reducing  fiscal
stress.
It may be argued that rainy-day funds, even if they are not earmarked  for specific
expenditures such as those of the U.S. states,  could reduce the volatility of social sector
expenditures  - and  could  do  so  without  simultaneously  stabilizing  non-social  sector
expenditures.  This differential  effect can happen  because politicians  may prefer  certain
type of expenditures more than others. For example, during a lean year a politician facing
the decision whether to use the rainy-day funds to finance the construction of a new road
or to maintain the outlays for a certain school and health services could be more incline to
choose the latter. That is, it maybe the case that politicians care more about maintaining  a
certain  level  of social  sector  expenditures,  even  at  the  expense  of non-social  sector
expenditures.1
III.  THE  IMPACT  OF RAINY-DAY  FUNDS  ON THE  VOLATILITY  OF
EXPENDITURES
In the United States, state governments  are responsible in the allocation on what it
is known as the general  fund.  The general fund can be divided between social  and non-
social  sector  expenditures.  The  categories  used  for  social  sector  expenditures  in  the
General  Fund are:  elementary education, higher education,  Medicaid,  and cash assistance
programs.  In  the  non-social  expenditures  we  could  find  the  following  categories:
transportation,  correction,  and others.  We  will use  these  two type  of expenditures  to
measure the effect of rainy-day funds on the volatility of expenditures.
To  construct  a  measure  of the  volatility  of expenditures  (income),  we  ran  a
regression  between  expenditures  (income)  in  real  terms  and  a  trend  line.  Then,  we
predicted  the residuals  and obtained their absolute  value.  Thus, the absolute value of the
predicted residuals are used as a proxy for the volatility of expenditures (income).
' Such political preference  would be stronger in cases where the influence of labor unions is relatively
strong in the sector.
6The basic  specification  that we used  to test the'effect  of rainy-day  funds on the
volatility of expenditures  is the following:
Vol exp3,  = A3 1Volinc,,  + / 2Rainys,,1_ +  +  5,  (1)
where  Volexp  is the volatility of expenditures in state s at time t; Volinc is the volatility of
gross state product (GSP) in state s at time t; Rainy is the rainy-day fund balance in state s
at the  end of year t-1;  and  co  are  state fixed effects.  The above  variables  are in million
1988 dollars.
Data:  The data  are  drawn  from  a  number of different  sources.  State rainy-day
fund balances, and expenditures  were obtained from several issues of the Fiscal  Survey of
States and  State Expenditure Report  published  by  the  National  Association  of State
Budget Officers (NASBO).  Data on the characteristics of rainy-day  funds2 were obtained
from NASBO  (1999),  Wagner  (1999),  and Knight  and  Levinson  (1999a)  and  from  the
departments of finance of some states.
Results.  Table 3 shows the regression results-for (1), using data from the 1985  to
2000 period.  We find that a dollar in the rainy-day fund balance  decreases the volatility
of social sector expenditures  by about 34 cents. By contrast, column (3)  of Table 3 shows
that rainy-day  fund balances  do  not have  any effect  on non-social  sector  expenditures.
This  implies  that  rainy-day  funds  are  effective  in reducing  the  volatility  of the  social
sector expenditures but are ineffective  as an overall budget stabilization fund. This result
is consistent with Sobel and Holcombe  (1996),  Wagner and  Sobel (2001), and Gonzalez
(2002),  which  as  mentioned  found  that rainy-day  fimds  do not reduce  the  volatility  of
aggregate  spending.  Also, column (1)  of Table  3  shows that states with higher volatility
of income have a higher volatility in social sector expenditures.
Most  of the  regression  results  depicted  in  columns  (1  and  3)  of Table  3  are
statistically  significant  at  a  90  percent  level  of  confidence.  We  tried  a  variation  on
2 See Table 2.
7specification  (1),  using volatility  in per capita  gross  state product instead of Volinc. As
shown in column (2) in Table 3, the result is greater precision in the estimated coefficient
of the rainy-day variable. A Hausman's  specification test was also performed, indicating
that the regression  results  from a random effects  specification  are biased.  However, its
coefficients are statistically significant and have the same sign as the fixed effects results.
Finally,  all of the regression results depicted in column (4) are not statistically significant,
which  implies  that  there  is  no  correlation  between  the  volatility  of  non-social
expenditures  and the rainy-day fund balances and the volatility of gross state product per
capita.  We tried different specifications  and found the same results.
IV.  RAINY-DAY  FUND BALANCES  AND  CHARACTERISTICS
The  characteristics  of state rainy-day  funds  differ  across  states.  They differ  in
particular in their deposit  and withdrawal  rules  as well as  the fund's  size.  Some  states'
laws mandate  deposits to rainy-day  funds in certain years.  In others, they are determined
by a formula  based  on the projected  revenues.  The  majority of the  states require  only
regular  legislative  approval  for  withdrawal  of  these  funds.  This  allows  coverage  of
revenue shortfalls, but has the drawback of not providing very stringent controls to ensure
that funds  are left untouched  until they are needed.  "Some states have maximum  limits,
or caps, on fund sizes.  These limits range  from 2 percent to 25  percent of expenditures.
The most  common  limit  is  5 percent,  the  generally  accepted  minimum  level of total
balances  by  credit  rating  agencies  (Eckl  (1997)),  and  the  amount  suggested  by  the
National Conference of State Legislatures  (Sobel and Holcombe (1996))."3
To  examine  the  determinants  of the  size  of the rainy-day  fund,  we  constructed
three dummy variables.  The  first is a dummy that indicates  if the state has an stringent
deposit rule for its rainy-day fund.  This variable takes the value of 1 if the state requires
that some money should be deposited  into the rainy-day  fund account,  and the value  of
zero  otherwise.  The  second  dummy  indicates  whether  the  state  has  an  stringent
withdrawal rule for its budget stabilization fund.  Specifically,  this variable takes the value
3 Knight and Levinson (1 999a).
8of 1 if the  state requires a super majority approval  in Congress, and zero otherwise.  The
third dummy indicates whether the rainy-day fund has a cap or not.
The following  specification  was estimated to explain the observed  differences  in
the states' rainy-day fund balances.
Rainy,, = A/Rainy 5 ,,., + l2Withdrawi, +,f 3Cap 5,, +f34Deposi(, +f 5 lincomen,  +,  6GrowtA,  +  eV,  + e,,  (2)
where Rainy is the rainy-day  fund balance  in state s at the end of year t;  Withdraw is  a
dummy variable indicating if the rainy-day fund has an stringent withdrawal rule;  Cap is
a dummy variable  indicating if the rainy-day fund has a cap; Deposit is a dummy variable
indicating  if the  rainy-day  fund  has  an  stringent  deposit  rule,  Income  is  gross  state
product  (GSP)  per capita in  state  s  at time t,  Growth is  the  growth  rate  of gross  state
product, and co are state fixed effects.
Results. Table 4 shows the regression results  for (2) by using data from the 1985
to 2000  period.  We  found that,  relative  to the  mean,  states  with  stringent  deposit rules
have  124 percent more money on their rainy-day  fund accounts than states without those
strict rules.  Also, we  found that states  with stringent  withdrawal  rules,  on average,  137
percent  more  dollars  on their rainy-day  fund  accounts  than  states  without  those tough
withdrawal rules.  Contrary  to expectation,  the coefficient  for the rainy-day  fund's cap is
not statistically significant, although it has the expected  sign.  Further, high-income  states
have  higher  rainy-day  fund  balances  than low-income  states.  Finally,  states  with high
economic  growth rate have higher rainy-day  fund balances  than those  states  with lower
rates. These results are consistent with those from Sobel and Holcombe  (1996).
All  of the  results  depicted  in  Table  4  are  statistically  significant.  Also,  using
Hausman's  specification  test,  we find  that the regression  results from  a random  effects
specification  are biased. However,  its coefficients are statistically significant and have the
same sign as the fixed effects results.
9V.  CONCLUSION
In  this  paper  we  examine  the  effect  of rainy-day  funds  on  the  volatility  of
expenditures.  We  found that rainy-day  funds  have a negative  effect on the volatility of
social  sector  expenditures  and  has  no  effect  on  the  volatility  of non-social  sector
expenditures.  Therefore,  rainy-day  funds  appear  effective  in reducing  the  volatility  of
social sector expenditures but are ineffective as an overall budget stabilization  fund. The
finding of a differential  effect of rainy-day funds on the volatility of social and non-social
spending qualifies earlier results regarding their effectiveness.
With respect  to the determinants of the size of rainy-day funds across states,  the
conclusion is that states with stringent deposit and withdrawal rules have higher balances.
Therefore,  these  states  are  the most effective  in reducing  the volatility of social  sector
expenditures.  Moreover, unsurprisingly,  the effectiveness of the rainy-day funds depends
on economic  growth.  Higher rates  of growth  means  greater potential  for accumulation
and less pressure  to spend the rainy-day fund.  These findings hold important lessons  for
the establishment  and maintenance  of an effective stabilization  fund to reduce volatility
of public  social  spending,  although  their  application  might  not be  straightforward  in
developing  countries  where  political  maturity  is  lacking  and  effective  governance  is
weak.
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Paper  Findings (and critiques)
Pollock and Suyderhoud (1986)  The authors claim that formula-based rainy-day
funds  can be destabilizing if not properly
implemented. They used simulations to support
their claim.
Navin and Navin (1994)  The authors examined the movement of the fund
balances over time (between 1983 and 1991), to see
how the fund balances move in relation to a number
of indicators of state fiscal health. They show that
use of the funds varies significantly among the
states as does the level of funding and therefore the
ability of the funds to serve as an effective tool for
counter-cyclical  state fiscal policy.
Sobel and Holcombe (1996)  The  authors  examined  the  degree  to  which rainy-
day  funds  eased  the  fiscal  stress  experienced  by
states during  the  1990-1991  recession.  The authors
constructed  a  measure  of state  fiscal  stress  as the
amount  of  discretionary  tax  increases  plus  the
amount  by  which  expenditure  growth  fell  below
average.  Then they constructed  an empirical  model
to see whether the presence  of an explicit rainy-day
fund  had  an  effect  on  the  degree  of  fiscal  stress
experience  by a  state.  Sobel  and Holcombe  found
that rainy-day  funds  were  effective  reducing  fiscal
stress  if  they  had  mandatory  requirements  for
making  deposits.  Also  they  show that  for  a  given
amount of fiscal  stress,  states  that  have  rainy-day
funds are more likely to cope with that fiscal stress
through  spending reductions  than through increases
in taxes.
Knight and Levinson (1999a)  The authors  examined the effect of rainy-day funds
on state savings  behavior. In particular,  the authors
point  out that  states  with  rainy-day  funds  maybe
inherently savers. If this were the case, states would
save enough in their general  fund accounts to avoid
fiscal stress without the creation of special accounts.
Knight and Levinson (1999b)  The  authors  examined  fiscal  institutions  in  US
states, and their  fiscal and economic  consequences.
The  authors  point out  the  interaction  of rainy-day
funds  with  other  fiscal  institutions.  In  particular,
Knight  and  Levinson  discuss  the  endogeneity  of
balanced budget requirements  and rainy-day funds.
Wagner (1999)  The  author  shows  that  increase  in  state  budget
stabilization  funds  is  attributed  to  the  1980-1982
recession.  The  existence  of  tax  and  expenditure
limitation  laws,  revenue  uncertainty,  the  state's
current  fiscal  health,  and  political  motives  also
influence a state's choice to adopt a fund.
Fasano (2000)  The  author  examines  the  experience  of oil  funds
currently  in  place  in Norway,  Chile  (copper),  the
State of Alaska,  Venezuela,  Kuwait,  and Oman. He
13finds that their experience  has been mixed.  But that
in most  of the  cases,  stabilization  funds  have been
effective by making budget expenditure  less driven
by revenue  availability.  Their  effectiveness  appear
to  be  determine  by  fiscal  discipline  and  sound
macroeconomic  management.
Wager and Sobel (2001)  The authors find that states with tax and expenditure
limit  laws  were  significantly  more  likely  to adopt
statutory funds, but were  significantly  less  likely to
adopt  funds  with  stringent  deposit  and withdrawal
rules,  suggesting  that some  funds  were  adopted  to
circumvent existing fiscal constraints.
Gonzalez (2002)  The author shows that most of the states are not well
prepared for the most recent recession.  In particular,
he finds that 4 out of 50 states have  enough rainy-
day funds  to ease a similar recession  than that of the
early  1990s.  Also, he concludes that the reason  why
some  states  don't have  enough  savings  is because
they have reached their cap on the fund size.
14Table 2
Rainy-Day Fund Characteristics
State  Fund Name  Year  First  Deposit  Rule  Withdrawal  Maximum  Fund
Adopted  Balance  Rule  Size
AL  Education Trust Fund-  1927  1988  Formula  Appropriation  2%  of
Proration Prevention  expenditures
Account
AK  Budget Reserve  Fund  1986  1991  Appropriation  Appropriation  No limit
AK  Constitutional Budget  1990  1991  Mineral  revenues in  3/%  of legislature  No limit
Reserve  excess of pernnanent
fund
AZ  Budget Stabilization  1990  1994  Statutory formula  Statutory  Rolling cap
Fund  formula
AR
CA  Special Fund for  1976  1977  General  Fund Surplus  Revenue  No limit
Economic  Uncertainties  shortfall
CO  Required  Fund Balance  1982  1982  4% Revenue forecast  Revenue  4% revenue
I______  _______________________  I____________  ___________  _______________________  shortfall  forecast
CT  Budget Reserve  Fund  1979  1984  Not less than 10% of  Govemor  5% of current net
General  Fund Surplus  request  and 2/3  General Fund
legislative  appropriations
approval
DE  Budget Reserve  1979  1979  General  Fund Surplus  3/5 of  5% of General
Account  legislature  Fund Revenue
FL  Working Capital Fund  1959  1965  General  Fund Surplus  Revenue  10% of previous
shortfall  year's General
Fund Revenue
FL  Budget Stabilization  1992  1995  Required appropriation  Revenue  IO/o of previous
Fund  equal to 5%  of last  shortfall  year's  General
year's general fund  Fund Revenue
revenue
GA  Revenue Shortfall  1976  1976  3% of General fund  Appropriation  No limit
Reserve  surplus
HI  Emergency & Budget  2000  2000  40% of Tobacco settle.  Appropriation  No limit
Reserve  Fund
ID  Budget Stabilization  1984  1984  Appropriation  Appropriation  No Limit
Fund
IL  Budget Stabilization  2001  2001  Balance of Tobacco  Controller's  No  Limit
Fund  reserve fund  Discretion
IN  Counter-Cyclical  1982  1985  Statutory formula  Statutory  7% of General
Revenue  and Economic  formula  Fund Revenue
Stabilization Fund








IA  Economic Emergency  1984  1992  Appropriation  Appropriation  5% of revenue
Fund  estimate  for that
fiscal year
KY  Budget Reserve  Trust  1983  1983  General Fund Surplus  Appropriation  5% of General
Fund Account  and appropriation  Fund Revenue
KS  General  Fund Ending  1993  1993  7.5%  of General Fund  Appropriation  No limit
Balance  expenditures that year  I
LA  Revenue Stabilization  1990  1999  Revenues exceeding  Appropriation  No limit
and Mineral  Trust Fund  $750 million from
minerals  .
15State  Fund Name  Year  First  Deposit Rule  Withdrawal  Maximum Fund
Adopted  Balance  Rule  Size
ME  Rainy Day Fund  1985  1985  1/2 of  General  Fund  Appropriation  5% of General
Surplus  Fund Revenue
MD  Revenue Stabilization  1985  1986  Required appropriation  Appropriation  Less of 5% of
Account  equal to 5%  of  General  Fund
estimated GF revenue  revenue or $50
that year  million
MA  Comrnonwealth  1985  1986  General Fund Surplus  Appropriation  5% of budgeted
_____  Stabilization  Fund  revenue
Ml  Countercyclical  Budget  1977  1978  Statutory formula  Statutory  25% of General
and Economic  formula  Fund Revenue
Stabilization  Fund
MN  Budget Reserve  1981  1984  Appropriation  Appropriation  $522 million
Account
MN  Cash Flow Account  1995  1996  Appropriation  Appropriation  $350 million
MS  Working Cash  1982  1983  Appropriation  Appropriation  7 I/l %  of  General
Stabilization  Reserve  Fund Revenue
_______  Fund
MO  Budget Stabilization  1992  1992  Appropriation  Appropriation  5% of  previous
Fund  year's General
Fund Revenue
MT  . __
NC  Savings Reserve  1991  1991  General  Fund Surplus  Appropriation  5% of General
_______  Account  _  Fund Revenue
ND  Budget Stabilization  1987  1990  General  Fund surplus in  Revenue must  No limit
Fund  excess of $40 million  be 2  1/2%
below forecast
NE  Cash Reserve  Fund  1983  1984  General Fund Surplus  Revenue  No limit
shortfall
NH  Revenue Stabilization  1987  1987  General  Fund Surplus  Revenue  5% of  General
Reserve Account  shortfall  Fund Revenue
NJ  Surplus Revenue Fund  1990  1993  50% of General  Fund  Revenue  5%  of anticipated
Surplus  shortfall  General Fund
Revenue
Tax Stabilization  1945  1946  Statue  Revenue  No limit
NY__  Reserve Fund  shortfall
NY  Constitutional Reserve  1993  1994  General  Fund Surplus  Appropriation  No limit
Fund
NM  Tax Stabilization  1966  1967  Appropriation  Revenue  No limit
Reserve  . . shortfall
NV  Budget Stabilization  1994  1994  Statutory formnula  Revenue  10% of  General
Designation  shortfall  Fund Revenue
OH  Budget Stabilization  1981  1985  5% of previous year's  Appropriation  No limit
Fund  General Fund revenue if
surplus is realized
OK  Constitutional  Reserve  1986  1988  10% of  previous year's  Govemor  No limit
Fund  General  Fund revenue if  request and 2/3




OR  General Purpose  1995  1995  Appropriation  Appropriation  No limit
Emergency  Fund
PA  Tax Stabilization  1985  1986  15% of General Fund  2/3 of  3% of anticipated
Reserve Fund  Surplus  legislative  General Fund
approval  Revenue
RI  Budget Reserve  and  1985  1985  Appropriation  Revenue  No limit
Cash Stabilization  shortfall
Account
16State  Fund Name  Year  First  Deposit Rule  Withdrawal  Maximum Fund
.___________________  Adopted  Balance  Rule  Size
SC  General  Reserve Fund  1978  1978  Statue requiring 3%  of  Revenue  No limit
previous year's General  shortfall  and
Fund revenues  zero balance in
CRF
SC  Capital  Reserve Fund  1986  1986  Statue requiring 2%  of  Revenue  No limit
previous year's General  shortfall
Fund revenue
SD  Budget Reserve Fund  1991  1992  General  Fund Surplus  Revenue  5%  of General
shortfall  Fund
appropriations
TN  Revenue Fluctuation  1972  1972  10% of estimated tax  Revenue  5% of estimated
Reserve  revenue growth  shortfall  tax revenue
TX  Economic Stabilization  1987  1990  V.  of General Fund  Revenue  10% of General
Fund  surplus plus oil and gas  shortfall or  Fund revenue
royalties  appropriation
UT  Budget Reserve  1986  1987  25% of General Fund  Revenue  8% of General
Account  Surplus  shortfall  Fund
appropriations
VA  Revenue Stabilization  1992  1995  Statutory Formula  Statutory  10% of annual tax
Fund  Formula  revenues
VT  Budget Stabilization  1988  1988  General  Fund surplus  Revenue  5% of  prior year's
Trust Fund  shortfall  appropriation
WA  Emergency Reserve  1981  1989  General  Fund Surplus  2/3 legislative  5% of  biennial
Fund  approval  General Fund
Revenue
WI  Require Reserve  1981  1981  1%  of General Fund  Revenue  No limit
Revenue  shortfall
WI  Budget Stabilization  1985  1985  Appropriation  Appropriation  No limit
Fund
WV  Revenue Shortfall  1994  1995  General  Fund Surplus  Revenue  5% of  General
Reserve Fund  shortfall  Fund
I______  I____________________  ___________  _________  I____________________  I_____________  appropriations
WY  Budget Reserve  1982  1983  Appropriation  Appropriation  5% of  estimated
Account  General  Fund
I__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  I_________  _  revenue
Sources: Gonzalez (2002), Wagner (1998), Knight and Levinson (1999), and NASBO (1999).
17Table 3
Estimates  on the effect of  Rainy-Day Funds on the Volatility of  Expenditures
____  ~~~~~~~1  2  3  4
Dependent  Volatility of Social  Volatility of  Volatility of Non-  Volatility of
Variables  Sector Expenditures  Social Sector  Social Sector  Non-Social
Expenditures  Expenditures  Sector
Expenditures
Volatility  6.05e-08*  9.56e-08*
of GSP  (2.2e-08)  (4.34e-08)
Volatility  0.156*  0.091
of GSP per  (0.067)  (0.14)
capita
Rainy-Day  -0.33**  -0.209*  -0.2  0.022





Fixed  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
effects
(State)
N  695  695  694  694
R square  0.45  0.394e  0.76  0.7
F  4.25  3.69  2.44  0.21
Note:  Robust Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  Statistically significant at a 95 percent level of confidence.
**  Statistically significant at a 90 percent level of confidence.
18Table 4
Rainy-dayfund characteristics  and balances
5
Dependent Variable  Rainy-Day Fund Balance
Rainy-Day Fund Balance in the previous  0.1 1*
year  (0.047)
GSP per capita  0.025*
(0.0079)
Growth rate of GSP  848.6*
(423.4)
Stringent Deposit Rule  219.2*
(85.7)




Fixed Effects  Yes
N  484
R square  0.17
F  9.01
Note:  Standard  errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at a 95 percent  level of confidence.
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